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CoNTRACTs-RELEASE-MisREPRESENTATION BY· RELEAsoR's ATTORNEY-AvornANCE BY RELEASOR FOR UNILATERAL MISTAKE AS TO
CoNTENTs-Under the objective theory of mutual assent, which bases
the imposition of contractual obligations on the expressed inte?-t of the
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parties, rather than on a subjective meeting of their minds,1 the law has
generally granted relief to the sigl).er of a contract who is under a misapprehension as to its contents only where he can show that the mistake •
was made without negligence on his part.2 The theory of affording relief in such a case apparently is that the instrument does not really
represent the expression of the signer's intent~ and the contract is, therefore, void at its inception.3 In view of the usual catagorical statements
of the general theory of objective assent, such as, "not assent, but what
the other party is justified in regarding as assent, is essential," 4 the
logic of the cases allowing relief for unilateral mistake as to the contents
of the writing seems somewhat strained, unless it is realized that a reasonable-man standard of objectivity is being used.5 This ,is demonstrated by the emphasis in these cases on the negligence of the signer,
which precludes him from obtaining relief. 6 Thus, in determining the
standard of care to which a signer of a contract is to be held, it has been
repeatedly decided that a literate person must read the contract himself,7 and that a person who is illiterate must get someone to read or
explain it to him. 8 Indeed, it has sometimes been held that such negligence will prevent the releasor from avoiding the release even where
there has been fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the releasee. 9
l l CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, §§ 70, 71 (1932); l WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,
rev. ed., §§ 66, 67 ( 1936) ; Williston, "Mutual Assent in the Formation of Contracts,"
14 lLL. L. REV. 85 (1919)..
2
l WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed.,,§§ 90A, 95A, and 1577 (1936); I PAGE,
CoNTRACTS, 2d ed., §§ 270, 271 and 272 (1920).
·
'
8
5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed., § 1577 (1936): "Where the signer of a
writing has made an innocent mistake as to the nature of his act without carelessness,
whether induced by fraud or not, the writing is not his expression, and there is no
contract." 1 PAGE, CoNTRACTS, 2d' ed., §270 (1920); Foster v. McKinnon, L.R.
4 C.P. 704 (1869).
4
l WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed. 89 (1936).
11
I CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 76 (1932): "One who makes a written offer
which is accepted, or who manifests acceptance of the terms of a writing which he
should reasonably understand to be an offer or proposed contract, is bound by the contract, though ignorant of the terms of the writing or of its proper interpretation."
6
Professor Wigmore argues that the emphasis on negligence represents a compromise between the objective and subjective standards, avoiding the impracticalities of
both. 9 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 2413 (1940).
7
5 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed., § 1577 (1936); I PAGE, CONTRACTS, 2d
ed., § 270 (1920); Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45 (1875); Tremont Trust Co. v.
Burack, 235 Mass. 398, 126 N.E. 782 (1920); Collier v. Stebbins, 236 Mich. 147,
210 N.W. 264 (1926) •.
8
Shulman v. Moser, 284 Ill. 134, 1191'f.E. 936 (1918); Leddy v. Barney, 139
Mass. 394, 2 N.E. 107 (1885); Morstad v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 23
N.M. 663, 170 P. 886 (1918); Blossi v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 144 Iowa 697,
123 N.W. 36.0 (1909); II L.R.A. (N.S.) 182 note at 199 (1907).
9
George E. Sebring Co. v. Skinner, 100 Fla. 315, 129 S. 759 (1930); Reid,
Murdock & Co. v. Bradley, 105 Iowa 220, 74 N.W. 896 (1898); Dowagiac Mfg.
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In the- recent case of Ricketts v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,1° this
general problem was presented in a rather interesting way. The
plaintiff, a waiter in one of the defendant's dining cars, sued the defendant for damages for personal injuries sustained in the course of his
employment.' When the defendant pleaded a general release by the
plaintiff of all his claims against the defendant; the plaintiff sought to
avoid iton the ground that he had signed the release without reading it,
relying on representations made by an attorney, _whom he had retained
in connection with a claim against the defendant for back wages and tips.
In holding the release invalid, Judge Learned Hand apparently treated
the representations of the attorney as -those of a third person, unrelated
to the plaintiff by agency, because the attorney's authority did not extend to the settlement of the claim for damages from personal injuries.
He held that the plaint}ff was justified in not reading the release since
he relied on the representations of an attorney as to its contents.
It is, however, difficult to determine the exact grounds upon which
Judge Hand based his decision. Since the holding that the releasor was
. not negligent in: failing to read the release runs contrary to a considerable array of authority, it seems regrettable that his. opinion did not
elaborate on his position in this regard. Discussion of this point is
limited to the following statements:
" ... The release would still be invalid even though the plaintiff signed it without reading it, for he would have been justified
in relying upon what his lawyer told him of its contents. The
theory upon which a document binds one who signs it, but who
_does not read it, is that either he accepts it whatever may be its
contents, or that he has been careless in choosing b.is informant." 11
Authority in support of such a view is meager. The Canadian case
of Herchmer v. Elliott 12 would seem to square very well with this decision, for there an assignment of a mortgage was avoided because it
had- been signed through misrepresentation by the signer's attorney.
Strangely enough, in that case the court did not discuss, or even mention, the duty of the signer to read the instrument before signing it.
Moreover, this seems to be the only case exactly in accord on this point.
The New York case of Pimpinello v. Swift & Co.18 and the often-cited
1

Co. v. Schroeder, 108 Wis. 109, 84 N.W. 14 (1900); Welsh v. Kelly-Springfield Tire
Co., 213 Ind. 188, 12 N.E., (2d) 254 (1938). See also, 34 M1cH. L. REV. 705
(1936). I
10 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946) 153 F. (2d) 757.
.
11 Principal case at 760.
12 14 Ont.- Rep. 7H (1887).
13 253 N.Y. 159, 170 N.E. 530 (1930).

'
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Throughgood's Case 14 can both be distinguished on the ground fhat
there th~ signers were unable to read. ,
To the contrary is the case of Hand v. Allen,15 where the releasor
sought to avoid the effect of the release by showing that he had not
read it, but had signed it in reliance upon his attorney. The Illinois
court held there that if the releasor " ... did not know its contents, his
negligence was inexcusable...." 16 The holding in this case is in line
with the familiar ruling that a literate signer will not be excused from
carrying out the terms of a contract because he had not read it when he
signed, unless ,the other party used fraud to prevent him from reading
it. 17 This ruling has been followed so consistently by our courts that it
would now seem basic in our law as to the formation of contracts.
Furthermore, the very theory of objective mutual assent works to restrict the enlargement qf any exceptions which allow a contra;ct to be
avoided on the basis of unilateral mistake.18
2

Judge Hand dwells at some length on the scope of the attorney's
authority as the releasor's agent, concluding that there was sufficient
evidence to justify the jury's finding that the attorney had authority
only to collect back wages and tips. He states that the release would
have been valid if the authority of the attorney had extended to settlingall claims the releasor had against the release. Judge Swan, in his cli,ssenting opinion, agrees with this statement, and dissents only on the
ground that on the evidence presented the jury was not justified in finding that the attorney's authority was limited to collecting back wages
and tips.
In supporting his position, Judge Hand starts with the accepted
doctrine that if the attorney's authority had extended to settling all of
the releasor's claims against the releasee, the releasor would have been
held responsible for any deception practiced by his attorney on the releasee in reaching the settlement.19 From this he concludes that the
2 COKE 5b (1581).
294 Ill. 35, 128 N.E. 305 (1920).
16 Id. at 56.
17 Notes 2, 6, 7 and 8, supra.
18 McClintock, "Mistake and the Contractual Interests," 28 MINN. L. REv. 460,
passim ( I 944).
.
19 I AGENCY RESTATEMENT, § 261 (1933): "A principal who puts an agent in a'
position that enables the agent, while apparently acting within his authority, to comniit
a fraud upon third persons is subject to liability to such third persons for the fraud."
And § 262: "A person who otherwise would be liable to another for the misrepresentations of one apparently acting for him, under the rule stated in § 261, is not relieved
from liability by the fact that the apparent agent acts entirely for his own purp~ses,
unless the other has notice of this."
See also, Fifth Ave. Bank of N.Y. v. Forty-Second Street and Grand St. Ferry R.
14
15
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releasor should likewise be held responsible, in such cases, for deception
practiced by his attorney on the releasor himself, even where there is no
deception of the releasee; and since, under this theory, the misrepresentation of the releasor's attorney is attributable to the releasor himself,
he would not have been allowed to make use of it to avoid the release
had the attorney's authority been general. Since, however, the reason
tor the basic doctrine from which Judge Hand starts is that a principal
must assume responsibility for inj;ury to others resulting from the apparent authority with which he clothed the agent, it is difficult to see
why it should apply in a case where no third person has been deceived.
In the principal case the releasee is relying upon a document which was
executed-by the releasor, not by an apparent agent; and the releasee
was in no way misled by the misrepresentations of the attorney, nor was
he in any way responsible for them. Instead, the misrepresentations
were made only to the releasoi::. In view of these facts, the main question presented appears to be whether or not the releasor was negligent
in making the mistake as to the contents, or in other words, whether or
not a literate layman will be excused from reading a contract himself
because it has _been interpreted to him by a lawyer. It seems doubtful
that the answer to this question should depend on the particular purpose for which the attorney has been retained. If a layman is not negligent in relying on his own attorney's representations as to the contents
of a contract where th~ attorney has been retained to collect a claim
for back wages and tips, it does not seem that there is any good r~ason ·
to hold him negligent for the same sort of reliance where the attorney
has been retained to settle claims for damages from personal injuries.20

3
Judge Frank in his concurring opinion agreed with the logic of
Judge Hand's position,21. but chose to place his decision on different
grounds. He does not believe that the objective theory of mutual consent can f>ring about a just result in these cases. Being of the opinion
that the courts, realizing this, have found indirect means of giving relief
to releasors in hard and unjust situations, he would have courts openly
Co., 137 N.Y. 231, 33 N.E. 378 (1893); Ripon Knitting Works v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 207 Wis. 452, 240 N.W. 840 (1932).
20 Principal case at 760. The agency argument was considered and rejected by the
court in Pimpinello v. Swift & Co., 253 N.Y. 159, 170 N.E. 530 (1930).
2 1. In his concurring opinion Judge Frank stated his understanding of Judge Hand's
opinion as follows: "Judge Hand says (and I entirely agree) that the evidence sufficiently sh9ws that the lawyer acted beyond his authority. Accordingly, it is as if a
non-lawyer, carefully selected by the plaintiff, had erroneously interpreted the release
. to him. The case thus comes within the category, described by Williston, of nonnegligent unilateral mistakes preventing the formation of yalid contracts."
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acknowledge their "unexpressed rationale" 22 and afford special protection to employee-releasers where the liability released arises pursuant
to the Federal Employers Liability Act. His basis for adopting such a
doctrine is the economic inequality of the employee's bargaining power
in dealing with his employer.28 Under this- doctrine the courts would
look to the circumstances surrounding-the execution of the release and
to the consideration given the releaser, and enforce the release only if
convinced that it had been fairly and justly agreed upon. This doctrine
is generally recognized and accepted for the special protection of seamen.24 It is concisely stated in the leading case of Garrett v. MooreMcCormack Co.:
"A shipowner, who, in defense of an action by a seaman for
personal injuries ... is under the burden of proving that it was
executed freely, without deception or coercion, and that it was
made by the seaman with full understanding of his rights. The
adequacy of the consideration and the nature of the medical and
legal advice available to the seaman at the time of signing the release are relevant to an appraisal of this understanding." 25
-It does seem to be true that the "unexpressed rationale" of many of
the cases which afford relief to the releaser has been a recognition of his
need for special protection from coercion and econbmic pressure by employers and large corporations. Williston has called it a "tenderness
for injured plaintiffs," 26 while Wigmore describes it as follows:
Principal case at 769, note 44.
Patterson, "Equitable Relief for Unilateral Mistake;' 28 CoL. L. REv. 859
at 893 (1928): "The harshest applications of this legal doctrine (denying rescission)
are found in cases of release of personal injury claims. Here there is frequently the
grossest inequality between the negotiating individuals (the injured party and the
claim-agent or other representative of the tort-feasor) in native intelligence, education
and economic bargaining power. The release is prepared in technical language by a
skillful lawyer, and is made broad enough to cover every future situation which his
fertile imagination can conceive. On the other hand, the i'!l,jured party (if he has no
lawyer, at least) is stimulated by the immediate situation which presses upon him: his
physical suffering, his need of money, his helplessness."
24 Premeaux v. Socony-Vacum Oil Co., (Tex. 1946) 192 S.W. (2d) 138; Garrettv. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 63 S. Ct. 246 (1942); Hume v. MooreMcCormack Lines, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 336; Sitchon v. American
Export Lines, (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 830; Bonici v. Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey, (C.C.A. 2d, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 437.
Judge Frank found a broad hint by the Supreme Court that the doctrine as to
seamen should be applied to non-maritime employe~s in the following language: "For
somewhat comparable cases involving releases for personal injuries arising from nonmaritime torts, see..•." Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 at 248,
note 17, 63 S. Ct. 246 (1942).
25 Syllabus 3, 317 U.S. 239, 63 S. Ct. 246 ( 1942).
26 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 1551 at p. 4348 (1936).
22
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"In general, the modern trend is to lay down no one or more
rules of thumb, but to develop a special doctrine in each Court for
that class of cases, liberaIIy relieving the party who has_ signed the
release." 21
Modern cases would seem to bear these statements out, for many
courts have not been'reluctant to find fraud or misrepresentation present
on the part of the releasee,28 and some have complained pointedly of
the over-reaching tactics of claim agents. 29 'A few have even impliedly
imposed on the releasee the obligation of seeing that the injured re- ·
leasor fuIIy understands all his legal rights in the matter.80 Others have
been quite wiIIing to find that the releasor was in so shocked and unfit ,
a mental condition that he was unaware of what he was doing. 81
In all these cases, however, the courts have clung to the theory that
a contract can be avoided because of the signer's mistake as to its co.q.tents only if the signer was not negligent in making that mistak:e.82
Both the view of Judge Hand. and that of Judge Frank thus mark a
departure from this established rule as to the formation of contracts.

Neil McKay, S.Ed.

9 W1GMORE, EvmENcE, 3d ed., § 2416 at p. 55 (1940).
Megee v. Fasulis, 57 Cal. App. (2d) 275, 134 P. (2d) 815 (1943); Lefebvre
v. Autoist Mut. Ins. Co., 205 Wis. II5, 236 N.W. 684 (1931); Shus v. Powers-Simpson Co., 85 Minn. 447, 89N.W. 68 (1902).
29 l I L.R.A. (N .S.) I 8 2 note at 200 ( l 908) ; Tyner v. Axt, I I 3 Cal. App. 408,
298 P. 537 (1931); Carr v. Sacramento Clay Products Co., 35 Cal. App. 439, 170
P. 446 (1917).
so Jordan v. Guerra, 23 Cal, (2d) ,469, 144 P.(2d) 349 (1943); Southern Pacific Co. v. Gastelum, 36 Ariz. 106, 283 P. 719 (1929); Miller v. Spokane International Ry. Co., 82 Wash. 170, 143 P. 981 (1914); Burik v. Dundee Woolen Co., 66
N.J.L. 420, 49 A. 442 (1901).
81 Airline Motor Coaches v. Parks, (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) 190 S.W. (2d) 142;
Schnieder v. Raymond, 106 Conn. 72, 136 A. 874 (1927); Colorado City v. Liafe, 28
Colo. 468, 65 P. 630 (1901); Christiansgn v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 67
Minn. 94, 69 N.W. 640 (1896); U'nion Pacific Railway Co. v. Harris, 158 U.S. 326,
15 S. Ct. 843 (1895).
82 Patterson, "Equitable Relief for Unilateral Mistake," 28 CoL. L. REv. 859 at
893 (1928): "The courts have been quite willing to find fraud, innocent misr~presentation, or mutual mistake in these cases. Where the facts cannot be fitted into one of
these categories, relief is commonly denied, even though it be accepted as a fact that the
injured party did not understand the language of the writing."
27
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